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North Carolina businessmen who associate themselves with national
franchisors and would provide the North Carolina courts with an ascer-
tainable standard by which to scrutinize franchisor abuses.
ELIZABETH ANANIA
Family Law-Constitutional Right of Privacy: The Father in the
Delivery Room
Eleven years ago in Griswold v. Connecticut1 the United States
Supreme Court gave full constitutional recognition to a broad and
fundamental realm of protected human conduct. This conflux of rights
was termed generally by the Court as the right of "privacy."'2 With the
source of this newly developed right ambiguously stated and its scope
extremely uncertain, lower courts have had little guidance in determin-
ing the bounds of its practical application. In the recent case of
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital' Judge John Paul Stevens of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (now Justice
Stevens of the United States Supreme Court) was presented with the
problems of determining the breadth of the right to privacy and the
limits placed upon it by countervailing societal interests. At stake were
the important, if not fundamental, rights of a father, mother and doctor4
in having the father present in the delivery room at childbirth.5 The
court, unwilling to entangle itself in a medical dispute,6 held that the
parents' interest in having the father present was of insufficient magni-
tude to invalidate hospital regulations forbidding fathers from entering
the delivery room.'
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Id. at 484.
3. 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
4. Plaintiffs argued that the hospital regulations improperly restricted their doc-
tors' rights to practice medicine. Although the trial court found no standing in plaintiffs
to assert their doctors' rights, the court of appeals found standing under Griswold in
which a doctor was allowed to assert his patient's rights. The appellate court ruled that
since plaintiffs had no protected rights in themselves they had no greater claim when
standing in their doctors' stead. Id. at 721-22 & n.23.
5. Id. at 717.
6. Id. at 721.
7. Id.
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Plaintiffs in Fitzgerald were married couples who had completed
training" in the psychoprophylactic method, or as it is more commonly
known, the Lamaze method of natural childbirth. At the filing of the
complaint in federal district court,'" each couple, with one exception,
was either expecting a child or had recently had a child at Porter
Memorial Hospital,"' the public hospital named as defendant.' 2 Seek-
ing injunctive and declaratory relief and damages' on the ground that
their constitutional rights of privacy had been violated,1" plaintiffs1r
challenged the official hospital policy that prohibited the "presence of
8. Plaintiffs presented in their brief a summary of their required childbirth
preparation:
This method requires a serious commitment on the part of those partici-
pating. Husbands and wives must attend a series of classes that include lec-
tures, films, question and answer periods, instruction in controlled breathing
and relaxation techniques, and discussions on various pregnancy-related topics.
This advance preparation and training serve to prepare the couples for the
events that take place during pregnancy, labor and delivery, and enable them to
function as a team during labor and delivery, with the husband supplying
physical and emotional support to his wife. 523 F.2d at 717 n.2.
9. The Lamaze method is a recognized "method of analgesia (pain relief)" in
childbirth that was "evolved" in the West by the French scientist Lamaze. It is traceable
to its original developer, the famous Russian scientist Pavlov. Olds & Witt, New Man in
the Delivery Room-the Father, TODAY'S HEALTH, Oct. 1970, at 52, 55.
The theoretical basis of the method has been described as giving "a woman's brain
so much to think about consciously and so many new reflexes to deal with subconscious-
ly, that whatever pain might occur cannot register on the brain." Part of the husband's
role is "to keep his wife's brain busy coordinating the breathing rhythms and relaxing
techniques she has learned." Id.
10. The district court's decision and opinion were given in an unreported memoran-
dum decision on September 10, 1974. 523 F.2d at 718.
Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). 523 F.2d at 718
n.4. An alternate basis of jurisdiction was set forth in the complaint under 28 U.S.C.
section 1331 (1970) with the requisite statement of amount in controversy. 523 F.2d at
718 n.5.
11. 523 F.2d at 717.
12. Also named as defendants were members of the board of directors and the
administrator of Porter Memorial Hospital. Id. at 718.
13. Id.
14. In particular it was alleged that the first, fourth, ninth and fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution were violated. Id. 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (1970) was used
as a remedial basis, 523 F.2d at 718 & n.4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The court of appeals noted that there was no question that Porter Memorial Hospital was
"a public hospital and that its actions are 'under color of state law' within the meaning of
§ 1983." 523 F.2d at 718 & n.4.
15. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of others similarly situated as well as on their own
behalf, id. at 718; however, no ruling was rendered by the district court on the request
that the suit be certified a class action. Id. at 718-19. The court of appeals did not
touch upon this issue.
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any person... in the Delivery Rooms.. . other than.. . Medi-
cal. . . and Nursing Staff."' 6
The district court dismissed the complaint, finding no constitution-
al violation since plaintiffs were not denied access to the hospital facil-
ities. Nor were they totally prohibited from using a medically approved
operation.17 In addition it was held that plaintiffs had no standing to
assert the rights of their physicians.' 8  On appeal, Judge Stevens, writ-
ing for the Seventh Circuit, upheld the district court's dismissal of the
complaints.'9
Although the court of appeals acknowledged that the decision to
have or not to have a child is constitutionally protected, the court held
that the decision of "where, by whom, and bywhat method" a child is
delivered is of a lesser magnitude. 20  Based upon this conclusion,
the court found that the parents' interest in their children gave them no
"greater right to determine the procedure to be followed at birth than that
possessed by other individuals in need of extraordinary medical assist-
ance."
21
Having found in this manner that the parents' rights were not of
fundamental importance, the court noted two policy considerations that
it used to justify its dismissal of plaintiffs' case. First, the court ex-
pressed concern that a decision in plaintiffs' favor would require a
holding grounded in the rights of the individual as opposed to rights that
have their origin in marriage.22 Since these rights could not be limited
to the marriage relationship, the court feared that such a decision could
be easily extended to create new rights of "companionship" in unwed
parents and patients in stress about to undergo serious surgery,2" and
16. Id. at 717.
17. Id. at 718-19.
18. Id. at 719.
19. Id. at 722. By the time the case was reviewed by the court of appeals all
plaintiffs had given birth to their children; however, the court found that the case was
not moot under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973): "Pregnancy provides a classic
justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be 'capable of repetition yet
evading review."' Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d at 717-18 n.3, quoting
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 125 (1973).
20. 523 F.2d at 721.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 720. The court recognized that the Supreme Court placed emphasis upon
"the private aspects of the institution of marriage" in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); however, Judge Stevens noted that Griwsold was not limited narrowly to
marital rights. 523 F.2d at 720. The court's concern is borne out by the fact that
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Jane Roe's right to abortion was based on a
"privacy" right though she was not married when pregnant.
23. 523 F.2d at 720 n.16.
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additionally, could be extended to a patient claiming a right to choose
surgical procedures to be used. 4 Secondly, the court observed that
there were "valid medical reasons for exclusion in individual cases. '2 5
Consequently, the court found it too unpalatable a result to impose an
"inflexible rule upon all hospitals" by substituting its own judgment for
the "professional judgment" of the hospital staff.26
The weight that should be given the parents' interest in choosing
delivery procedures must be determined by reference to the Supreme
Court "privacy" decisions preceding Fitzgerald. As long ago as 1891
the Supreme Court gave protected status to a form of personal privacy
right, which it articulated in Union Pacific Railway Company v. Bots-
ford as the "inviolability of the person."27 Various later decisions found
that rights of personal autonomy deserved constitutional recognition in
equal protection or due process contexts in activities relating to mar-
riage,26 family relationships,29 control over one's children's education, 0
and procreation.3 1 These family related rights were deemed "fundamen-
tal"32 or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"838 the threshold
prerequisites to constitutional protection and close judicial scrutiny.8 4
Breaking with the tradition of piecemeal cataloguing of fundamen-
tal personal rights, Griswold v. Connecticut5 recognized that there were
"zones of privacy" formed by the "penumbras" of specific guarantees
listed in the Bill of Rights,86 in particular, the first, third, fourth, fifth
and ninth amendments.8 7  Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in
Griswold, found that the marriage relationship was embraced by one of
24. Id.
25. Id. at 721.
26. Id. at 721-22.
27. 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891).
28. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statutes prohibiting marriages between
races violative of equal protection and due process).
29. See id.; cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 ,U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting dis-
tribution of contraceptives to single people violative of equal protection).
30. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (statute preventing parents
from sending children to religious schools violative of due process "liberty"); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute forbidding teaching of foreign language violative
of due process "liberty").
31. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization law violative of equal
protection).
32. See, e.g., id. at 541.
33. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
34. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 484.
37. Id.
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these constitutionally preserved "zones of privacy" and that it thus
required close judicial scrutiny, which in Griswold resulted in invalida-
tion of the offending legislation."' The difficulty in determining the
source, meaning and scope of the marital right to privacy, as well as in
determining the balancing test to be utilized when the right is present, is
compounded by the diversity of viewpoints on each aspect of the issue
expressed by the individual concurring justices in Griswold.
Justices Goldberg, Warren and Brennan, in a concurring opinion
in Griswold,39 identified the ninth amendment as the source of the
marital right to privacy, an additional, fundamental personal right re-
served to the people.40 Accordingly, this ninth amendment right was
viewed as being within the sheltering concept of "liberty" in the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause.41 With such a right in ques-
tion, Goldberg, Warren and Brennan required that the state show an
interest that was "compelling" or the statute could not be sustained.42
Justices Harlan and White, who wrote separate opinions concurring in
the result,43 found the due process clause to be sufficient in itself to
establish the marital right to privacy.44 While Harlan would seemingly
require the state to show a compelling interest,45 White demanded that
there be a showing of "substantial justification" before a state can enter
into this "realm of family life."'46 These divergent notions have left
many unanswered questions concerning the right of privacy.47 How-
ever, it is clear that regardless of its origins or its breadth, there is a
constitutional right to privacy that attaches to at least some family
relationships, particularly the marriage relationship.4 s Furthermore,
when it is present and is threatened there must be, at a minimum, a
38. Id. at 485-86. Douglas expressly rejected a return to the substantive due"
process approach present in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In addition to
citing the cases that overruled the Lochner approach, Douglas wrote: "We do not sit as
a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch
economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions." 381 U.S. at 482.
39. 381 U.S. at 486.
40. Id. at 488, 491-92.
41. Id. at 493.
42. Id. at 497.
43. Id. at 499, 502.
44. Id. at 500, 502.
45. See id. at 499-502.
46. Id. at 502.
47. Plaintiffs in Fitzgerald appeared unsure of the source of the right of privacy
themselves since they based their claim on both the penumbral rights from the Bill of
Rights and the word "liberty" in the due process clause. 523 F.2d at 719.
48. See text accompanying notes 62-69 infra.
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showing of "substantial justification" for the encroaching statute or
regulation.49
The nature and the limits of this marital or family-related zone of
privacy are the critical factors in determining whether parents have the
right to assure the father's presence at childbirth. The cases used by the
Griswold Court to illustrate the application of the right to privacy show
that this right encompasses two general, separate catagories of rights.10
First, there is the "right to be let alone."" Secondly, there is an
affirmative, "activist"52 right possessed by people generally that is char-
acterized best as the right to the "orderly pursuit of happiness."5" It
was this latter category of rights that plaintiffs pressed upon the appel-
late court in Fitzgerald. Judge Stevens described this right as "the
individual's right to make certain unusually important decisions that will
affect . . . [ a person's] own, or his family's, destiny." 4
The court of appeals' finding in Fitzgerald, that the interests put
forward by plaintiffs did not represent "'basic values'... dignified by
history and tradition," 55 was based upon two conclusions: that the
father's presence was of less importance than the protected right to
have a child,56 and that privacy rights did not grow out of family re-
lationships but out of the individuals' rights.57 Asserting that the
source of any privacy rights in marriage is the right of privacy in the
individual, the court attempted to justify its refusal to give special
consideration to the marital and family relationships.5 Although it is
unquestionably true that rights in marriage stem from individual
49. For an in-depth study of Griswold, the right to privacy and its historical roots
see Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1965);
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1410 (1974); Kauper, Penumbras,
Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold
Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965).
50. See cases listed at 381 U.S. 482, 484 and note 51 infra.
51. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
A more recent case illustrating this principle is Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)(a state's power to regulate obscenity does not extend to mere possession by individual of
obscene material in his own home).
52. The "activist"/"passive" rights dichotomy was considered in Dixon, The Gris-
wold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MiCH. L.
Rnv. 197 (1965).
53. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). It was held in Loving that freedom
to marry was one of these essential personal rights.
54. 523 F.2d at 719.
55. Id. (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 721.
57. See id. at 720-21.
58. See id,
1302 [Vol. 54
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rights, 9 the appellate court ignored a great many cases that have held
that the "private realm of family life!"60 is an area of particular import-
ance and sensitivity.81
The cases that have dealt with family relationships portray a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. '62  The right
of privacy consists of more than a parent's right to have or not to have
children.6 3 It is more than a parent's right to send a child to religious
schools6 or to have his children study a particular subject.6 5 The right
to privacy is more than the right to marry freely66 and more than the
right to "establish a home and bring up children. 67 These are simply
the landmarks of a "zone of privacy" that surrounds "family life,"68
"something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its pro-
tection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional
right."6 9 In light of this history of the fundamentality of family life,
Judge Stevens has left the question of parental rights unresolved by
writing that the right to determine the manner in which one's child is
born is less important than the right to decide to have the child. 70
If the hospital has entered into this realm of family affairs, the
court was obliged to seek out some form of "substantial justification" if
it were to uphold the restrictions." ' The court need not have upheld
plaintiffs' case, but it was obliged to examine plaintiffs? claims in
59. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
60. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
61. See cases cited notes 62-69 infra.
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965), quoting Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (emphasis added).
63. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
64. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
65. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
66. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
67. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
68. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It
should be noted that reference was made in Griswold to this dissenting opinion as
authority. 381 U.S. at 484.
69. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70. An appropriate analogy exists in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In
Meyer the Court said that liberty "denotes.. .the right.. . to marry, establish a home
and bring up children." Id. at 399. The Court did not stop at that point but held that
the parents had a right to have their children study German, contrary to the Nebraska
statute. Bringing up one's children in a chosen manner (to learn German) in effect was
included within the more important right, the right to have and bring up children
generally. Although the right to choose the manner in which one's child will be born is a
less important right, it appears to be part and parcel of the larger right, the right to have
and to rear children.
71. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra,
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relation to the "medical" interests asserted by defendant hospital. In
short, the court was duty-bound to scrutinize the conflicting interests
and balance them in reaching its decision. 72 If after careful examina-
tion the court had dismissed plaintiffs' case it would have done so on
firmer ground. However, direct judicial review of the hospital rules was
refused.7 3
The court refused review of the regulations in deference to the
medical profession.74 The dissent in Fitzgerald argued strongly for at
least a hearing of the evidence. 75 If the court had weighed the evidence
carefully it might have been unable to support soundly its decision
upholding the hospital regulations.
In a footnote Judge Stevens listed several medical articles illustrat-
ing the split in medical opinion and supporting his conclusion that there
were valid "medical reasons" for sustaining the hospital rules. 70  The
strongest argument made in these articles against a father's presence
consisted of a list of "medical reasons" that may be summarized in part
as follows (some of which apparently influenced and were incorporated
into the court's opinion): 77 (1) anything can go wrong in the delivery
room; (2) "using the tactics of this lobby [i.e., persons seeking to
enforce these rights of privacy through legislative or other legal means],
and with similar reasoning" the principle may be extended to other
operations; (3) intimacy has its limits--"a girl simply is not at her
romantic best in a delivery room;" (4) the training of doctors and other
medical personnel is more difficult and less effective with the father
present; (5) the increased threat of malpractice suits growing out of a
husband's account of the doctor's actions; (6) risk of infection-every
person whose presence is not essential should be excluded.7
There are several difficulties with using such reasoning as exem-
plary of valid "medical reasons" as the court did in Fitzgerald. A
couple's romantic concerns clearly are beyond the range of a doctor's
expertise in delivery room procedure. The fact that parents' rights may
be extended to future cases is primarily a legal matter, not a medical
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is an example of such a balancing
approach.
73. 523 F.2d at 720.
74. Id. at 721.
75. Id. at 722.
76. Id. at 721 n.22.
77. See id. at 720 n.16 & 721 n.22.
78. Morton, Fathers in the Delivery Room-An Opposition Standpoint, HosPrTAL
Topics, Ian. 1966, at 103-04.
1304 [Vol. 54
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issue. Assuming that there is a real threat of an increase in the number
of malpractice suits, which is in itself questionable, 9 again it is a legal
argument, not a medical justification. Additionally, questions arise as
to the seriousness and the urgency of the claim that student doctors may
have trouble learning about delivery procedure when the father is
present. The only specific "medical reason" listed in the article cited by
the court is the possibility of infection caused by the father's presence
(this concern was also raised as a "medical reason" by the defendant
hospital). However, that possibility is not based upon a greater likeli-
hood of a properly prepared father causing infection, but a greater
likelihood of infection generally with the increased number of persons
present during childbirth.80 Ironically, no such concern was expressed
about increasing the chance of infection by the presence in the operating
room of a number of student medical personnel. Although the court
did not expressly accept all of the listed reasons in its rationale, it im-
plicitly recognized them as valid medical justifications and as evidence of
a medical dispute.81
It is probable that there are valid and important medical reasons
beyond those noted by the court in its footnote of medical authority, but
it is clear that Judge Stevens -bowed too easily to those persons within the
medical profession who voiced objections to the Lamaze or related
procedures. In addition, there was an impressive array of "uncontra-
dicted" evidence within the record that included surveys that reported
more than 45,000 births without a single infection "traceable to the
practice [of childbirth with the father present] and not one malpractice
suit."'8 2 Also, the record of the district court contained affidavits by a
Clinical Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology of the Chicago School
of Medicine who found "no evidence in current obstetrical literature
indicating that the presence of husbands . . . (assuming proper safe-
guards are taken) would be hazardous. . . ."83 The benefits of the
method were summarized by the professor (who had delivered approxi-
mately one thousand babies in the past four years with fathers present)
as follows: (1) "the father's presence. . . has an extremely stabilizing
effect on the mother;" (2) the mother is able to "bear down more
79. The dissent noted surveys contained in the trial court record -that showed that
in over 45,000 births with the father present, no malpractice suit arose. 523 F.2d at 722.
80. Morton, supra note 78.
81. See 523 F.2d at721 &n.22.
82. 523 F.2d at 722.
83. Id. at 723.
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intensively," shortening labor; (3) the shortened labor increases the
chance of a baby being healthy and decreases the possibility of hypoxia
(insufficient oxygen); (4) "no greater number of hospital personnel are
in attendance when the father is present .... -4 Also, the doctor
stated that he had had no serious incident occur due to the father's
presence in approximately one thousand births. In light of this evi-
dence the dissenting judge was surely justified in his view that an
evidentiary hearing was required.
The Fitzgerald decision is important in three respects. First, it
provides one court's answer to the broader issue presented-when there
is a dispute within the medical profession the courts should not inter-
vene. Secondly, it establishes an unfortunate but influential precedent
in its denial of the parents' interest in having the father in the delivery
room. Thirdly, Fitzgerald provides an interesting view of the approach
of Justice Stevens toward the right of privacy, a right championed by his
predecessor, Justice Douglas. If Fitzgerald is an indication of how
Justice Stevens views the right of privacy, it is unlikely that this right will
be extended beyond the facts contained in the cases that have espoused
it.
If this right to privacy is a right that has been created and expand-
ed to meet the needs of a changing society, which it apparently is,85
Fitzgerald presents an ideal case for its application. Childbirth with
husband participation is of growing significance88 and comes easily
within the realm of the marital and family relationships. It is not the
final decision reached in Fitzgerald that is worrisome, for there may be
truly weighty medical or other reasons for upholding the hospital rules.
However, the court should have looked at the strength of the medical
evidence and applied it to the particular case before it, keeping within its
consideration less drastic alternatives.8a If in the balance the same
84. Id. at 722-23.
85. This point is presented very convincingly in Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy,
74 COLUM. L Rnv. 1410, 1427-31 (1974).
86. The American Society for Psychoprophylaxis in Obstetrics (ASPO) has esti-
mated that approximately 247,500 couples were trained in the Lamaze technique in 1975.
Letter from Melba A. Gandy, Executive Director of ASPO to NoRTI CAROLINA LAW
REVIEW, Jan. 22, 1976, on file in U.N.C. Law Library.
Ms. Gandy also expressed concern that new dangers would arise with hospital rules
restricting a father's presence: a danger that is becoming more and more evident is that
when hospitals do not permit the father to be present, couples are choosing to have their
child at home, physically separated from hospital facilities that may be vital in the event
of difficulties during delivery. Id. at 2.
87. Possible compromise measures were suggested in Goetsch, Fathers in the
Delivery Room-'Helpful and Supportive,' HosPrrAL ToPics, Jan. 1966, at 104,
1306 [Vol. 54
ABORTIONS AND STERILIZATIONS
decision were reached it would have been a better result than shying
away from the right because the balance was difficult or controversial or
because it called into question medical opinions. Constitutional rights
can be dealt with and medical concerns may at the same time be given
due weight and respect.
Epic M. NEWMAN
Hospitals-A Current Analysis of the Right to Abortions and
Sterilizations in the Fourth Circuit: State Action and the
Church Amendment
The United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade' found that the
right of privacy guarantees a woman the prerogative of having an
abortion "free of interference by the State."2 The right of privacy also
includes the fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a
child3 and therefore implicitly encompasses the sterilization decision.4
However, in Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton,' the Court let stand
a section of the challenged Georgia abortion statute that allows a hospital
to refuse to admit a patient for an abortion. The Court noted that the
purpose of this provision was "obviously... to afford appropriate pro-
tection.., to -the denominational hospital."6 Thus an enigma remains:
how valuable is the Roe guarantee to an abortion or sterilization free of
state interference if under Doe some hospitals may absolutely refuse to
admit patients for such operations?'
As Roe guarantees abortions "free of interference by the State," an
initial inquiry must concern the scope of the duty thus imposed. Clear-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 163. The absoluteness of the right depends on the trimester of
pregnancy concerned.
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
4. Compare the sterilization decision with the personal rights listed in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53 that have been held to be part of the right of privacy.
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. Id. at 198. However, the Court generally spoke in terms of "hospital" without
any qualification.
7. The Roe and Doe opinions are to be read together. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
165.
8. See Note, Hill-Burton Hospitals after Roe and Doe: Can Federally Funded
Hospitals Refuse to Perform Abortions?, 4 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 84
(1974).
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